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Abstract
The fog of war is inherent in the nature of war. In whatever form it may takefriction, ambiguity, chaos, uncertainty, or combinations thereof -the fog of war is a central and prevailing characteristic of war. This is well known, as it has been continually espoused, initially by Clausewitz in On War, and subsequently in the U.S.
Armed Forces doctrine and each services war colleges. Students and participants of war are schooled and readily aware of its nature. The proponents of network-centric warfare, however, purport the fog of war can be eliminated by gaining total information dominance over an enemy, and by networking information technologies throughout the joint battlespace. The hypothetical transformation of war through technological advances is a prevalent thought in the U.S. military; this type of thinking is wrong and potentially dangerous. This paper argues it is not enough to simply study and recognize the concept and implications of the fog of war, or to incorporate them into doctrine. The ambiguity and uncertainty characterized by the fog of war must be institutionalized and become a central tenet of operational art as well as a driving influence in the U.S. military"s preparation and training for war. Nowhere do the associated implications of the fog of war have greater impact and effect than on information processing and decision-making.
Therefore, leaders at all levels must be aware of the human aspects of information and be trained to develop an adaptive, flexible, intuitive mind in order to deal with and make decisions in an uncertain, chaotic, dangerous, and fast-moving environment.
INTRODUCTION
The fog of war should be institutionalized in U.S. military doctrine and made a tenet of operational art. By "institutionalized" and "tenet" of operational art it is meant that the idea and concept of the fog of war and its associated parts -friction, uncertainty, chance, chaos, and ambiguity -be fully incorporated in how the U.S.
military thinks, plans, prepares, and trains for war. This may seem counterintuitive, for, arguably, any attempts to improve or develop a new approach to operational art is effectively an effort to do better than before; to "more effectively pierce the fog of war and to reduce uncertainty. 
BACKGROUND
This paper begins by defining the fog of war, the basic concepts of networkcentric warfare and arguments in favor of NCW. Since, arguably, Carl von
Clausewitz" On War has the single greatest influence on U.S. military theory and doctrine, this paper will limit the discussion concerning the fog of war to this work.
Additionally, since American military officers today most often refer to Clausewitz" unified concept of a general friction as the "fog and friction" of war, 6 for the purposes of this paper, the terms friction, uncertainty and chaos will be used interchangeably with fog of war and will be considered together. In the effort to support the central argument, this paper is limited to two topics: the human aspects of information processing and decision-making. The current thinking about the friction and fog of war and its influence on war delves into complexity theory and even evolutionary biology. 7 These topics will not be addressed, but fascinating insight can be gained into the nature of war for interested readers. The term "fog of war" refers to the amalgamation of certain characteristics of war, namely uncertainty, disorder, chance, friction, chaos, and complexity, among others.
In simple terms, not everything in war is knowable or foreseen; some measure of ambiguity will always exist. Even though the friction and the fog of war has been a consistent, recurring feature since the wars in the Greek and Persian empires, the earliest known use of the term "friction" occurred in a letter from Carl Von Clausewitz to his wife in September of 1806.
9 By 1831, the idea of friction and, by extension, the fog of war, had become a central theme of his seminal work On War.
10
Friction was unquestionably among the conceptual tools Clausewitz employed to understand the phenomenon of war and it eventually grew into a theoretical concept that lies at the heart of his approach to the theory and conduct of war. The early origins of network-centric warfare actually go back to the combat information centers in warships of the U.S. and British navies in World War II.
These centers provided the first tactical air picture which later became the Naval Tactical Data Systems (NTDS) of the 1960"s U.S. Navy which, through the introduction of digital tactical computers, provided a shared tactical picture.
19
However, "the organizing principle of NCW has its antecedents in the dynamics of growth and competition that emerged in modern society." 20 These dynamics are based on a business model of increasing investment returns and competition based on time, and competition between and within enterprises. 21 Information technology is central to these dynamics and the technology has shifted from platform-centric computing to network-centric computing. 22 In other words, it"s not about the computer, it"s about the computing power resulting from "information-intensive interactions" between huge numbers of computers linked through an equally large number of computational nodes on the network. 23 The idea is the same powerful dynamics produced through network-centric operations in the business world can be used in the U.S. military. With regard to achieving a mature and sophisticated theory of war as a whole, however, it is doubtful that [the U.S. military] has reached even the end of the beginning. Again, one must decide whether general friction will persist in future war or can be overcome by technological advances. That genuine disagreement persists on such a basic point suggests how far military theory must advance to achieve a solid empirical grounding.
39
The argument essentially comes down to two opposed military philosophies.
Milan Vego challenges the notion that, "[n]etwork-centric warfare has become a new orthodoxy -a set of beliefs that cannot seriously be challenged."
40 He argues the human aspects of war have been largely ignored, the Clausewitzian nature of war and the effects of the fog of war and friction are negligible, the art of war is indistinguishable from the science of war, and the enemy is merely a passing nuisance in the information age where "information superiority is assumed absolute, regardless of the opponent."
41
The most prevalent argument against NCW is that the human has been removed from the picture, particularly in regards to how humans process information. Moreover, Kaufman asserts by ignoring the human dimension of the information process, NCW overestimate man"s capacity to deal with contradictory information. 46 Clausewitz offers the following support:
Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain….In short, most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies. As a rule most men would believe bad news than good, and rather tend to exaggerate the bad news. The dangers that are reported may soon…subside; but…they keep recurring, without apparent reason.
47
Since Clausewitz speaks of the individual"s reaction to information and not about information itself, it leads one to believe no amount of networking will change the weight of his observation. Taken further, the importance of the human character of . Klein, Sources of Power, [197] [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] [204] [205] [206] [207] [208] [209] [210] [211] [212] [213] make a suitable solution. If an individual has a limited experience base and is in an unfamiliar combat situation, then this would be a time when the use of a comparative, deliberate, methodical, and rational model of decision-making would be useful.
Intuitive decision-making offers two huge advantages with respect to military operations: it is much faster than analytical decision-making, and it copes with uncertainty, ambiguity, and dynamic situations -the fog of war -more effectively.
64

RECOMMENDATIONS
The art of war deals with living and with moral forces. Consequently, it cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must always leave a margin for uncertainty, in the greatest of things as much as in the smallest.
65
Much that is written on the revolution of military affairs and network-centric warfare emphasizes the removal of the fog of war from combat and presumes the revolution is technological in nature. Technology has much to offer in modern warfare, however, the techno-centric view is dangerously disconnected from the human dimension; it does not take into account how humans process and perceive information, make decisions, or even the adversary"s capabilities, thoughts and/or desires. 66 A study of the conflicts in Vietnam and present day Iraq and Afghanistan show the U.S. tends to overestimate its technological superiority and underestimate the ability of opponents to nullify the U.S. advantages. The U.S. can no longer afford to do this. The U.S. military must bring Clausewitzian friction and the fog of war back into the forefront of current military thinking. It must also guide the U.S.
Armed Forces" outlook on just about everything; acquisitions, technologies, and 64. Schmitt, "How We Decide", p. 18. 65. Clausewitz, On War, p. 86. 66. Williamson Murray, "Clausewitz Out, Computer In: Military Culture and Technological Hubris", The National Interest, Summer 1997, p. 63. training, in order to create a fighting force that can adjust and better thrive in chaos whether it is generated by the adversary or ourselves.
The U.S. military, as an institution, must recognize intuition is a scientifically researched and documented capability of the human mind and a skill that can exceed even the most powerful analysis to achieve superior results. 67 Since intuitive decision-making is experienced-based, a broad experience base is vital to achieve the skill for pattern recognition; the basis of recognition-primed decisions.
68
Clausewitz states the only way to improve this experience base ("lubricant for general friction") is through combat experience. 69 Obviously, this is not always possible. Moreover, one would hope military training designed to increase intuitive decision-making would be conducted prior to the outbreak of war or hostilities. This paper suggests four options: improving the experience base through historical and contemporary study, historical case-studies and decision games, war gaming, and realistic "fog of war" training.
Modern warfare requires a very high level of specialized, dedicated professional education. The U.S. military must place greater emphasis on two areas of emphasis: options would allow substituting books that were specific to an individual"s occupational specialty. For instance, an aviator could swap one of the books on the professional reading list with another approved book specific to aviation. Although a sufficient amount of time would be given to individuals to complete the professional reading program requirements for grade, emphasis would be placed on the importance of dedicated study of military history in a leader"s development. Incentives and encouragement would be provided to see this study is followed through.
Additionally, study in emerging fields that may offer insight to the nature and character of war, such as complexity theory, non-linearity, and evolutionary biology, for instance, could be encouraged in order to promote and provide new perspectives and out-of-the-box thinking for war fighters. The U.S. should continue to institute policies which encourage, support, and allow service members to pursue advanced degrees in applicable disciplines (e.g. military history, anthropology, regional studies, international relations, strategic studies, etc.) outside of the war colleges, either online or as resident students.
Historical case studies -battle and campaign studies -and decision games could Third, war gaming develops decision-making. Similar to the benefits of studying case studies, a broader experience base facilitates recognition-primed decision-making and intuition. Similar to chess, by anticipating the countermoves of the adversary, participants not only learn to make better decisions, but also through practice they learn to make decisions faster. In the end, war gaming can be practiced at all levels of warfare and can be as complex and simple as desired or needed.
Last, in order for war fighters and leaders to thrive in a chaotic, disordered, and uncertain environment, intuitive decision-making must be developed through realistic training and war gaming. This would include the type of war gaming and training where communications are lost and not regained (except after considerable time), GPS navigation systems are compromised or destroyed, information and intelligence is insufficient, faulty, suspect, confusing, contradictory, and/or overwhelming, fatigue
and exhaustion are present, initiative has been lost, the adversary has achieved surprise, and commanders must make rapid decisions with minimal knowledge. In other words, the U.S military should intentionally create the fog of war in training.
Clausewitz, as always, says it best:
Peacetime maneuvers are a feeble substitute for the real thing; but even they can give an army an advantage over others whose training is confined to routine, mechanical drill. To plan maneuvers so that some of the elements of friction are involved, which will train officers" judgment, common sense, and resolution is far more worthwhile than inexperienced people might think. It is immensely important that no soldier, whatever his rank, should wait for war to expose him to those aspects of active service that amaze and confuse him when he first comes across them. If he has met them even once before, they will begin to be familiar to him.
71
In closing, regardless of the approach, "the reality of war as a competitive human endeavor rules against the achievement of perfect understanding and the reduction of friction and uncertainty."
72 Those who can better thrive in chaos will prevail. The surest path to success is to put the fog of war back into modern warfare; to take into 
